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Discipline and New York University’s Institute for Public Knowledge. This paper was inspired by many 
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No Contest: Participatory Technologies and the Transformation of Urban Authority 
 
Michael McQuarrie 
 
The meaning of participation has been transformed in urban civil society. Once 
used as a tool for empowering urban citizens against politicians and growth-oriented 
elites, participation is now a tool for grounding political authority in the context of urban 
decline. Many sectors of urban civil society have become less independent even though 
they are well-funded and participatory. Large numbers of community-based organizations 
no longer empower neighborhoods, but weigh on them. Yet, we have trouble grappling 
with this transformation. Participation is still automatically associated with 
democratization, and community with authenticity and solidarity. Using a case study of 
the trajectory of participatory practices in community-based organizations (CBOs) in 
Cleveland, Ohio, I want to show how participatory practices have been transformed from 
tools of democratization into tools of elite authority.  
Cleveland is a revealing site to examine this transformation and it presents a 
puzzle. Cleveland is a large manufacturing city that has been in decline since the late 
1960s. This decline has posed a distinct challenge to the authority of the city’s elites. 
Through much of the post-war period their authority had been premised on the promise of 
economic and population growth.2 Decline made it impossible to deliver on that promise 
and the result was a general political crisis, capital strike, and municipal bankruptcy. In 
Cleveland, more than other cities, the tensions and conflicts that emerged from the crisis 
of elite authority were highly visible and highly contentious; indeed Cleveland has 
become the prototypical case of the “crisis of growth politics.”3 This crisis opened the 
door to populist and neighborhood-based critiques of urban authority that undermined 
popular consent to the rule of growth-oriented elites. In response, governance was 
rescaled to the neighborhood and reorganized to be more participatory. In some cases this 
was done through changes to the formal apparatus of political representation, in others it 
took the form of a devolution of governance functions to civil society organizations and 
nonprofits.4  
Despite leading the way in many of these transformations, and in spite of many 
premature celebrations of Cleveland’s renaissance, in 2004 Cleveland became the poorest 
big city in America. The city’s neighborhoods were again in crisis due to ongoing 
economic decline, outmigration, and predatory lending. Cuyahoga County, which 
contains Cleveland, had fifteen thousand foreclosures in 2007 alone. Along with 
foreclosures came a cycle of abandonment, demolition, and crime. Many of the city’s 
neighborhoods were visibly collapsing. The scale of the destruction and the absence of 
                                                 
2 John Logan and Harvey Moloch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1987). 
3 Todd Swanstrom, The Crisis of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich, and The Challenge of Urban 
Populism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985). 
4 These changes were not particular to Cleveland, see Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney, and Ken 
Thomson, The Rebirth of Urban Democracy (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1993); Lester Salamon, 
Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995);  
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effective response evokes images of an “organizational desert,” an absence of “social 
capital,” and a dead civil society. 
Yet on paper, Cleveland seemed well-situated to cope with the current crisis. 
Unlike in the 1970s crisis, the city is now armed with dozens of community-based 
organizations (CBOs) that are broadly supported by the city’s wealthy philanthropic 
community and the municipal government. Most of them exist to deal with neighborhood 
and housing issues. Many of them are self-consciously “participatory.” The problem, 
then, is not an absence of organizations designed to work on behalf of the city’s 
neighborhoods, or even an absence of participation by community residents in 
governance. The city’s civil society is thriving in organizational terms, but it is 
programmatically paralyzed. In fact, many of these organizations are only being kept 
alive through public subsidies, a significant indicator of the legitimacy of these 
organizations in the eyes of funders, if not their effectiveness.  
This very fact is indicative. In a moment of declining revenues, why would 
municipal government use taxpayer money to subsidize the housing production of 
community-based nonprofits when there is already excess housing and collapsing prices? 
The answer given by an official in the municipal Department of Community 
Development was simple: they want to keep the infrastructure of nonprofit CBOs alive, 
even if it puts a dent in the municipal budget and even though the houses produced will 
have no measurable positive effect on surrounding communities. What this demonstrates 
is that the city’s CBOs are legitimate in the eyes of funders and community development 
professionals even though they are not programmatically effective. The contrast with the 
1970s, when many CBOs were illegitimate to funders even though they were effective, is 
notable.  
This shift poses a natural question: what is the legitimacy of CBOs based on if not 
programmatic effectiveness? The answer, in brief, is that they underpin the authority of 
urban elites when promises of growth are understood to be empty. In this context, CBOs 
facilitate elite authority, not based on their programmatic effectiveness, but on their claim 
to effectively represent the city’s neighborhoods. From this perspective, what matters is 
that the organizations are participatory and that they are organized at the scale of the 
community or neighborhood.  
Unfortunately, most scholars of urban governance and civil society have not so 
much rejected the idea that these organizations underpin elite authority, they have not 
asked the question. The biggest obstacle to thinking about participation as a component 
of authority, whether democratic or hierarchical, is that participation is usually discussed 
as a practice that has some essence that produces determinate effects. Instead, I want to 
emphasize that “participation” is a flexible signifier the content of which is fought over 
for political gain.5 Advocates of participation claim that it results in more authentic 
deliberation, gives access to forms of knowledge that are marginalized among academic 
and policy elites, produces citizens that have greater concern for the general good, and 
furthers the democratization of society.6 On the other hand, critics argue that participation 
                                                 
5 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this characterization. 
6 This literature is vast. Examples of contemporary work making these claims, in rough order, Jane 
Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Xavier de Souza 
Briggs, Democracy as Problem Solving: Civic Capacity in Communities Across the Globe (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2008); Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 
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opens the door to extremism, enables the imposition of norms that can be exclusionary or 
repressive, corrupts the efficient operation of rational governance, produces political 
docility, and facilitates the management of the citizenry.7  
There are related analytical problems. It is sometimes assumed that participatory 
practices are characteristic of distinct institutional spheres such as civil society while 
being antithetical to markets and states. A common narrative of civil society 
organizations recounts their colonization by technocratic and market logics. Such 
colonization undermines the “free spaces” that sustain broad-based protest movements or 
diverts the strategic focus of movement organizations and political parties into the pursuit 
of organizational survival.8 By describing the process as the colonization of civil society 
by more instrumental and rationalizing logics, we are encouraged to think of participation 
as inherently characteristic of civil society and more democratic social relations at the 
same time as we assume that bureaucratization, and technocracy are characteristic of 
markets and states. Increasingly, scholars are finding that these assumptions are 
unwarranted: bureaucracies and hierarchies are produced in movements and community 
organizations while participatory practices are now routinely found in corporations and 
government.9  
Our assumptions about the effects of participation have a trajectory that reveals 
the source of some of these conceptual difficulties. After World War II, for example, 
totalitarianism was widely understood to be the product of mass mobilization—
suggesting that expert management, not participation, was the best safeguard of 
democracy.10 The rebellions of the 1960s changed all that. Participation was invoked as a 
tool to overcome the arrogance of experts as well as the atomization and alienation that 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: 
Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003). 
7 Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: Norton, 1994); Barbara Cruikshank, The Will 
to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Walter 
Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922); Philip Selznick, TVA and the 
Grassroots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1949); Steven Gregory, Black Corona: Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998); Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the 
Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
8 See, for example, Suzanne Staggenborg, “The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in 
the Pro-Choice Movement,” American Sociological Review 53, no. 4 (1988): 585-606. On free spaces see 
Sara Evans and Harry Boyte, Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992); and for a critical perspective see Francesca Polletta, “Free Spaces in 
Collective Action,” Theory and Society 28 (1999): 1-38. Also see Robert Michels, Political Parties: A 
Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1966) 
and Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), chs 8-9.  
9 Nina Eliasoph, Making Volunteers: Civic Life after Welfare’s End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2011) ; Cruikshank, The Will to Empower; Caroline Lee, “Five Assumptions Academics Make about Public 
Deliberation, and Why They Deserve Rethinking,” Journal of Public Deliberation 7, no. 1 (2011): 1-48; 
Edward Walker, “Privatizing Participation: Civic Change and the Organizational Dynamics of Grassroots 
Lobbying Firms,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 1 (2009): 83-105; Joel F. Handler, Down from 
Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity of Privatization and Empowerment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996). 
10 David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing 
American Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass 
Society (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction, 2008); Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel 
Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, (New York: Norton, 1993). 
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were the result of an overly rationalized and bureaucratic society.11 In the face of 
widespread protests and calls for greater self-determination, governments experimented 
with democratic and decentralizing reforms. At the urban scale, the Community Action 
Program and the opening of urban politics to African-American and neighborhood 
participation were important and early experiments with expanded participation both in 
electoral politics and in governance.12 Participation organized at the neighborhood scale 
was becoming a necessary part of institutional legitimacy in cities. Understanding how 
and why this happened reveals much about the nature of contemporary participation.13 
Since that time, participation has been institutionalized in a variety of governance settings 
from education, to community development, to policing.14  
This paper analyzes the changing role of participation in the constitution of urban 
political authority. I do this by tracing its institutional articulation in community-based 
organizations in Cleveland, Ohio, over the last 40 years. Broadly, the paper addresses the 
question: what makes participation worth fighting about in the context of urban 
governance? The short answer is that the collapse of the politics of growth and the 
emergence of populist and neighborhood-based critiques in the 1970s made it clear that 
expanded participation had become a necessary component of legitimate authority.  
Authority here is understood as beliefs that secure consent to the rule of another even 
when such consent is not self-serving. When consent cannot be justified rationally it rests 
on beliefs that legitimate rule.15 The promise of growth had underpinned urban authority 
in post-war America, but urban decline undermined the viability of growth as a 
legitimating belief. This vacuum was filled by the promise of neighborhood self-
determination. Once this was understood, resistance to broad-based participation in 
governance diminished and was replaced by a competitive struggle to define technologies 
of participation that would make participation safe for use as a component of the 
authority of elites.  
Treating participatory practices as technologies is a necessary step to break with 
tacit assumptions about the essential qualities of participation. By “technology” I mean a 
bundle of practices, metrics, discourses, and actors. “Technologies of participation” refers 
to arrangements of practices, metrics, discourses, and actors that perform community 
self-determination in ways that are designed to realize specific goals. From this 
perspective, participation should be thought of, not as a practice with essential 
                                                 
11 The New Left’s Port Huron Statement is expansive on each of these points. For an extended 
consideration of participation and its long-term cultural effects, see Francesca Polletta, Freedom is an 
Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2002); Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and 
the Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Luc Boltanski and Eve 
Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2005). 
12 Noel Cazenave, Impossible Democracy: The Unlikely Success of the War on Poverty Community Action 
Programs (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007); Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle 
for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008).  
13 For the best analysis of this change see John Mollenkopf, “Neighborhood Political Development and the 
Politics of Urban Growth: Boston and San Francisco, 1958-1978,” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 5, no. 1 (1981): 15-39.  
14 For example, see Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
15 Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): 941-955; 
Richard Sennett, Authority (New York: Norton, 1980). 
 6
characteristics, but as a practice that derives its significance from how it is situated 
relative to other practices, actors, and meanings.16 Treating participation this way enables 
a break with the assumption, prominent since the 1960s, that participation yields 
democratization and the expression of the unmediated voice of the citizenry.  
I focus on CBOs as the setting for analysis because they are often valued as ideal 
settings for participation. The analysis of participation in CBOs is one component of a 
broader study of the structure and genesis of the field of community-based organizations 
in Cleveland, Ohio. I analyze these shifts using a variety of sources including interviews 
with the leaders of every CBO in the city between 2000 and 2008 and archival research 
on the city’s CBOs dating back to 1966. I also conducted dozens of interviews with 
politicians, bureaucrats, program officers, strategic business organizations, and economic 
development organizations to understand the institutional context CBOs operate in. 
Cleveland is not a representative case, but a revelatory one. The crisis of growth politics, 
the nature of the Civil Rights and populist challenges, the extreme nature of the 
breakdown of political authority, the decisiveness of the defeat of community organizing 
and the rise of community development are not unique in terms of content, but are unique 
in their extreme nature. The case, then, places these dynamics into unusually sharp 
contrast. 
The analysis reveals three stages in the transformation of participatory 
technologies between 1970 and 2010, each characterized by a type of CBO. The first 
stage was characterized by community organizing groups which engaged in contentious 
politics and used participatory deliberation to make decisions. The community organizing 
groups were eliminated from the field in the course of competition with emergent 
community developers. The second stage was characterized by a competition between 
clientelist and technocratic CDCs. This resulted in the ascendancy of expert authority in 
the field. Finally, since 2000 consensus organizing has been deployed as a participatory 
practice that valorizes collaboration and partnership. Rather than serving as a challenge to 
elite and expert authority, participation is now deployed as a tool of that authority.  
 
Why Participation Matters: The Crisis of Growth Politics in Cleveland 
In the 1960s and 1970s Cleveland’s politics were exceptionally turbulent. Notable 
events included Civil Rights protest followed by neighborhood-based populist protest, 
two riots, the election of the country’s first African-American mayor, the election of a 
self-described “populist” mayor, a recall election, a capital strike, and municipal 
bankruptcy. These dramatic events were the product of a general crisis of growth politics. 
The politics of growth had secured the authority of urban elites when the city was 
thriving. However, with the refusal of African-Americans to continue to bear the costs of 
growth, and the collapse of American manufacturing, the promise of growth no longer 
had the ability to secure consent. The city became embroiled in a three-way struggle 
between mobilized neighborhoods, elected politicians and corporate elites over the right 
to define the content of legitimate political authority in the city.  
                                                 
16 The following demonstrate the analytical utility of a relational approach to political practices and 
participation: Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Militants and Citizens: The Politics of Participatory Democracy in 
Porto Allegre (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005); Eliasoph, Making Volunteers; Gregory, Black 
Corona; Ann Mische, Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth Activist 
Networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Polletta, Freedom Is an Endless Meeting.  
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In the 1960s it appeared that race would define the primary political divisions in 
the city. Cleveland was a hotbed of Civil Rights activism and the city’s electorate was the 
country’s first to deliver the mayoralty to an African-American, Carl Stokes (1968-71).17 
Yet, while race was the central question that divided the city in the 1960s, by the 1970s it 
had become a secondary issue and not simply because black civil society had been 
colonized by poverty programs.18 Of course, the politics of race never really goes away in 
a city like Cleveland. For example, the racial implications of various policies and 
programs, such as the funding of schools, the definition of real estate values, the 
definition of criminality, and the definition of civic corruption, are all entirely racialized. 
Moreover, the city is still one of the most segregated in the country and race is an issue in 
neighborhood politics.19 However, since the 1970s race has been secondary to the most 
important municipal alignments and battles. In the 1960s, African-Americans were allied 
to growth-oriented elites and white liberals in a reformist coalition opposed to the 
clientelist politics of the white, ethnic West Side. By the 1970s African-Americans in 
Cleveland were allied with West Side neighborhoods in a populist coalition opposed to 
politicians and growth-oriented elites.20  
The precipitating factor in this change was the economic crisis of 1973 which 
made it clear that American manufacturing was no longer competitive. For manufacturing 
cities like Cleveland the implications were dire and the city descended into a cycle of 
unemployment, declining revenue, declining neighborhoods, rising crime, and 
outmigration. This shifted the political dynamic from one focused on securing growth 
and dealing with its consequences, which had pitted white citizen against black, to a zero-
sum competition for state investment to minimize the consequences of decline. For 
example, to preserve the value of downtown real estate Cleveland’s governors 
scandalously spent tens of millions of dollars in Community Development Block Grant 
and Urban Development Action Grant money on white elephant projects, all while the 
city’s neighborhoods collapsed. When added to the ledger of violence to the city’s 
neighborhoods perpetrated via extensive highway building and urban renewal, these 
projects undermined the claim of elite private interests to be acting civically rather than 
out of self-interest. The city’s neighborhoods, black and white, revolted.  
The revolt took two forms. The most obvious one was the emergence of a new 
urban populist political coalition centered on the “boy mayor,” as he was known, Dennis 
Kucinich (1977-79). His victory signaled the effectiveness of a platform that empowered 
neighborhoods against centralized bureaucracies and growth-oriented elites. His claim to 
                                                 
17 Leonard N. Moore, Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black Political Power, (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2002).  
18 Kenneth Andrews, Freedom is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its 
Legacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Gregory, Black Corona.  
19 Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the 
Underclass (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
20 Since the 1970s race has been a source of political coalition building at least as often as it has been a 
source of contention. Two African-American mayors have been elected since Stokes, Mike White (1990-
2001) and Frank Jackson (2006-present). Both have had the classic problem of simultaneously representing 
a marginalized and stigmatized population and the interests of the city as a whole and both have used 
technocratic competence to manage this dilemma. For an excellent analysis of race and mayoral politics see 
J. Philip Thompson III, Double Trouble: Black Mayors, Black Communities, and the Call for Deep 
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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be the “People’s Mayor” signaled a new deference to the authority of neighborhood 
residents at the expense of experts and self-proclaimed civic leaders.  
Unfortunately, mayors need the support of pro-growth fractions, like the bankers 
who provide the liquidity necessary to do things like pay police officers and firemen. 
Unimpressed with Kucinich’s pro-neighborhood platform and his valorization of “the 
people” as a voice in urban politics, the city’s bankers staged a capital strike and 
launched a recall election (the precipitating issue was the privatization of a public utility). 
Perhaps to his credit, Kucinich refused to be disciplined by these maneuvers, but the cost 
to the city was high. A crisis of governance was laid on top of the economic crisis, a 
combination which would result in municipal bankruptcy a few years later. Kucinich 
defeated the recall but lost the next election to the pro-growth Republican, George 
Voinovich (1980-89). 
Kucinich’s mayoralty has been described as the institutionalization of Alinskyite 
organizing in formal politics.21 While this view can be sustained by a common 
valorization of “the People” and a privileging of neighborhoods at the expense of growth-
oriented elites, it is incorrect. Community organizing in Cleveland was just as hostile to 
elected politicians like Kucinich as it was to the city’s growth-oriented elites. A new 
breed of community organization disrupted the simple opposition, proposed by Kucinich, 
between neighborhoods and downtown.  
In addition to being a hotbed of Civil Rights organizing, Cleveland had also been 
home to early experiments in community organizing. By the mid-1970s, the city had 
several contentious organizations known as “Community Congresses. Like Kucinich, 
they claimed to represent “the People” and they wanted neighborhoods to have priority 
both in terms of policy and private investment. They were happy to use protest to realize 
their goals.22 While the organizations had a similar policy agenda to Kucinich’s, it 
quickly became clear that the new mayor and the Congresses were going to be enemies, 
not allies. Shortly after Kucinich was elected he agreed, after weeks of pressure, to attend 
a “Neighborhood Summit” to hash out a policy program with the Congresses. Kucinich 
failed to show and sent members of his administration instead. When they chose to 
lecture the audience rather than  engage in a dialogue about policy a neighborhood leader 
seized the microphone and hit Kucinich’s representative on the head with it. The 
amplified whack sparked a brawl that spilled out onto the grounds of the church that 
hosted the event (it is probably significant that this brawl took place in a church). 
Relations between the two self-proclaimed representatives of the People never recovered 
and Kucinich was a target of protests by the Congresses for the remainder of his term.  
The crux of the issue was the question of who had the authority to represent the 
People. It is not surprising that politicians claim that they do. What changed was the 
emergence of community organizations that also claimed to represent the People and that 
were intent on deploying their power to ensure that they were recognized. These 
organizations traded on New Left critiques of bureaucracy and Civil Rights critiques of 
political representation. Formal politics and government were not venues for the people 
to be heard, community organizations in civil society were. The breakdown of authority 
                                                 
21 Swantstrom, The Crisis of Growth Politics. 
22 Randy Cunningham, Democratizing Cleveland: The Rise and Fall of Community Organizing in 
Cleveland, Ohio, 1975-1985 (Cleveland: Arambala Press, 2007). 
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was complete. None of the competing mobilized interests, neighborhoods, politicians and 
their allies, and growth-oriented elites, were able to secure consent from the others. 
While Kucinich disagreed with the Congresses’ understanding of neighborhood 
representation, his successor, George Voinovich, did not. Unlike Kucinich, Voinovich 
was happy to devolve authority and governance functions onto new civil society 
organizations claiming to represent the communities they operated in. The idea of 
devolving governance functions onto civil society organizations was, until recently, as 
prominent on the anti-government Right as it was on the anti-government Left.23 
Voinovich traded this recognition for political space to recommit to the politics of 
growth. Some funds would be allocated to CBOs for neighborhood stabilization, but the 
bulk would go for economic development to support the city’s two growth poles. City 
Councilors supported this devolution of governance in exchange for greater control over 
federal Community Development Block Grants and the prospect of having a CBO in their 
wards that would be reliant upon them for funds. 
The demise of the Congresses paved the way for this emerging accommodation. 
As the Congresses won victories they became involved in neighborhood redevelopment 
programs and, in the process, they began creating community development corporations 
(CDCs) to implement the agenda of the People. At the same time, the Congresses became 
heavily involved in national and local campaigns to secure private investment in urban 
neighborhoods. One Cleveland campaign targeted the SOHIO Corporation, a large oil 
company (since purchased by BP). They protested shareholder meetings and pursued the 
company’s CEO. Their demand: $1 billion to reinvest in neighborhoods. The campaign 
culminated in 1982 at an elite suburban country club, the Hunt Club. With polo ponies as 
a backdrop, video footage of the event portrays amused Cleveland residents yelling 
slogans at the nonplussed and nattily-attired social elite of the city. But the protest 
divided the movement over the necessity of the “hit.” The consequences of the protest 
became dire when outraged philanthropists rescinded their funding while reserving future 
funding for organizations engaged in “bricks-and-mortar” development, not organizing.24 
The Congresses died as a result of internal conflict and a loss of funding, but the civic 
leadership of the city was committed to funding neighborhood redevelopment through 
CDCs.  
                                                 
23 See, for example, Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: From State to Civil 
Society (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977).  
24 Cleveland’s growth-oriented elites have long pursued growth and governance strategies through 
community foundations and strategic business organizations, rather than through government. For example, 
the first community chest and the first community foundation were both started in Cleveland according to 
Peter Dobkin Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 1700-1900: Private Institutions, Elites, and the 
Origins of American Nationality (New York: New York University Press, 1984). In the mid-1980s the 
Cleveland Foundation ran afoul of the Center for Responsive Philanthropy for precisely this reason, see 
Diana Tittle, Rebuilding Cleveland: The Cleveland Foundation and Its Evolving Urban Strategy 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992). For a more complete discussion of the role of community 
foundations and strategic business organizations in these developments see Michael McQuarrie, 
“Nonprofits and the Reconstruction of Urban Governance: Housing Production and Community 
Development in Cleveland, 1975-2005,” in Politics and Partnerships in American Governance, eds. 
Elisabeth Clemens and Doug Guthrie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); and Doug Guthrie and 
Michael McQuarrie, “Providing for the Public Good: Corporate-Community Relations in the Era of the 
Receding Welfare State,” City and Community 7, no. 2 (2008): 113-139. 
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Growth was not restarted as an outcome of Cleveland’s crisis of growth politics. 
Despite many and frequent announcements of recovery, the city has continued to lose 
jobs, corporate operations, and population (from nearly a million in 1970 down to 
400,000 today). However, authority had been reestablished and since the early 1980s 
decline has not been associated with political polarization. Through community 
foundations and strategic investments, growth-oriented elites have acknowledged that 
neighborhood stabilization is important for economic development. Politicians have 
learned to coexist with organizations that claim to be more authentic representatives of 
community. Bureaucrats are happy to fund CBOs to provide governance functions that 
were once performed by government agencies. The population of CBOs rode this wave of 
legitimacy and funding to a peak of fifty-five in 1996, even as the community organizing 
groups died.  
The question is: why were these organizations funded? Programmatic 
effectiveness has always been, at best, ambiguous. At the same time, community 
foundations and intermediary organizations have repeatedly demonstrated a commitment 
to the idea of participation in the CBOs they have funded and the idea that neighborhoods 
should have organizations that represent them. There are two reasons for this. First, the 
dual challenge of Kucinich’s populist coalition and the Community Congresses made it 
clear that the authority of urban institutions would have to rely on some expansion of 
popular participation in decision making and a decentralization of responsibility. 
Effectively, the neighborhood revolt of the 1970s was not defeated so much as it was 
institutionalized, not in the way preferred by many movement activists, but 
institutionalized nonetheless. Second, collaborating with CBOs, funding them, training 
them, and recognizing their legitimacy enabled growth-oriented elites and political 
leaders to reestablish their own authority. Politicians had been criticized for being a 
distinct class that acted to realize its own particular concerns. Likewise, the capital strike 
against Kucinich undermined the civic credentials of growth-oriented elites. Support for 
CBOs, organizations that presumably represent the authentic voice of neighborhoods, 
legitimates the claims of growth-oriented elites and political representatives to be civic 
actors rather than self-interested ones. In Cleveland, funding and recognition for CBOs 
are being exchanged for the symbolic capital that enables civic leadership.  
This eclipsed the question of whether or not participatory institutions were good 
or necessary in urban governance, it was acknowledged that they were. But a new 
question emerged: what sort of participation is best? This question was decided in inter-
organizational struggles for recognition, funding, and legitimacy. Participatory 
technologies were being developed to meet a variety of ends within the basic constraint 
that participatory practices were necessary. It is to these technologies that I know turn.  
 
Participation and Contention: The Rise and Fall of Broad-based Organizing 
 The Community Congresses were innovative and insistent experiments in citizen 
development. They challenged the way urban governance worked, forcefully arguing that 
neighborhoods should be heard and accounted for in policy. They privileged the power of 
people working together on issues of common concern and the power of confrontation 
and tension to alter the balance of power between urban communities and their 
governors. Participation by diverse neighborhood residents and stakeholders was 
essential to both of these aspects of the Congresses. Together, their internal deliberative 
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practices that constituted solidarity across race and class lines, their effort to address the 
people of the city as a whole, and their contentious rejection of both formal representative 
practices and the authority of growth politics meant the Congresses constituted a 
neighborhood-based counterpublic.25  
 Community organizing began in Cleveland with the sponsorship of the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese. The priests who led the effort were not particularly radical or 
confrontational, but racial tensions were a central issue and they worked hard to initiate 
dialogue across racial lines.26 Things changed when a former United Farmworkers 
organizer, Tom Gannon, was hired to lead the effort. For Gannon, the problem was that 
whites and blacks blamed one another for their problems when they should be blaming 
politicians and bureaucrats. Gannon’s organizing was premised on the idea that 
constituting “the People” across racial lines—and overcoming racial animosity—required 
confrontation with elites.27 Gannon built the Buckeye Woodland Community Congress 
(BWCC) as a cross-race, cross-class, people’s organization. When BWCC went public  in 
1975 it had 125 dues-paying organizational members, including churches, local 
businesses, fraternal organizations, and street clubs.  Before long the Congresses 
multiplied and took up issues as diverse as vacant houses, policing, porn theaters and 
liquor stores, energy costs, arson, redlining, and health care. They operated in poor 
neighborhoods, transitioning neighborhoods, and even affluent suburbs. 
 Participation in the Congresses played two distinct roles. First, broad-based 
participation was utilized as a tool to constitute the community through internal dialogue, 
deliberation, and strategic work on issues. Street club meetings represented geographic 
aspects of the neighborhood. At the level of the Congress there were “issue committees” 
responsible for research on issues of concern. Some worked on community issues, others 
worked on city-wide or even national issues. Finally, there were committees that dealt 
with internal governance. All of these deliberative fora were supported by professional 
organizers who were paid with dues collections, foundation grants, or government 
grants.28 Internal authority in the organizations was channeled through “leaders,” unpaid 
neighborhood residents who had a broad following in the neighborhood or who became 
skilled practitioners of community organizing. They led internal deliberations and 
                                                 
25 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1992): 109-142; Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone, 2002).  
26 Harry Fagan, Empowerment: Skills for Parish Social Action. New York: Paulist Press, 1979; Dan Reidy, 
“Project Interface Proposal to the Campaign for Human Development,” (Cleveland: Western Reserve 
Historical Society, Catholic Commission on Community Action Archive), 4-5. The best history of the 
Congresses is Randy Cunningham, Democratizing Cleveland: The Rise and Fall of Community Organizing 
in Cleveland, Ohio, 1975-1985, (Cleveland: Arambala Press, 2007). I have also made use of Cunningham’s 
excellent and numerous interviews which he generously deposited at the Western Reserve Historical 
Society. 
27 Cunningham interviews with Tom Gannon, Dan Reidy, Doug Von Auken. Randy Cunningham 
Community Organizing History Collection (Western Reserve Historical Society: Cleveland). 
28 Cleveland’s community foundations were intermittently supportive, but the Gund Foundation was more 
consistent than the Cleveland Foundation which preferred to fund the Local Development Corporations. 
The Catholic Campaign for Human Development was an early and consistent funder. Finally, the federal 
VISTA program funneled young volunteers into the Congresses. VISTA was imagined as a domestic 
version of the Peace Corps that was initially funded as part of Johnson’s War on Poverty. During the 
Clinton administration it was rolled into the Americorps program.  
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negotiations with targets. Nationally, the Congresses operated under the umbrella of 
National People’s Action (NPA), a Chicago-based community organizing network led by 
Gail Cincotta and Shel Trapp. NPA annual meetings were, like those of the member 
Congresses, representative, deliberative, multi-issue, and strategic. Whatever else they 
were, the Congresses were organized to ensure that the priorities of neighborhood 
residents would correspond with the goals of the Congresses, undiluted by experts or 
professionals. 
 Second, participation enabled the Congresses to perform the basis of their 
authority in confrontation with their opponents. This was intended to be pedagogical for 
people on both sides of the issue. Politicians were to be disciplined into respect for their 
constituents by the constant pressure applied by the Congresses. They were disciplined 
through protest actions, civil disobedience, and disruption. The Congresses shut down 
shareholder meetings and City Hall. They ran pickets against recalcitrant corporations 
and unresponsive city officials. For the members of the Congresses, these actions were 
classrooms of effective citizenship. One leader, Marlene Weslian, argues that “over time, 
organizing… did empower you.” “The more I gained in self-confidence and self-esteem 
the… more assertive I was in all areas of my life… [and] the more open to issues like the 
environment and war.”29  
 By constructing skilled and knowledgable citizens the Congresses hoped to 
reconstitute the polity and the economy, both of which had become enemies of 
neighborhoods and the People. Rather, than running candidates for City Council or 
negotiating new union contracts, this reform was to be accomplished from without by 
subordinating economic and political actors to the authority of neighborhood-based civil 
society organizations. In its newsletter, NPA claimed that in its member organizations the 
People were forged into a democratic instrument that could confront and be victorious 
against “bankers and bureaucrats.” The newsletter promised that the callow and self-
interested would ultimately submit to the will of the People now that NPA had “jammed 
open” the “revolving door” to “decision-making offices” thus allowing “the People to 
pass through” and reclaim their authority.30  
 The Congresses developed a variety of internal metrics that were used as 
indicators of organizational health and effectiveness. Some of them are entirely standard 
organizational practice: turn-out for events and actions, the use of agendas, and the 
presence of a broad bench of neighborhood leaders making strategic decisions for the 
Congress. Others were less formal. One important indicator of organizational health was 
the willingness of neighborhood leaders to engage in confrontational protest. The 
Congresses claimed to be more authentic representatives of the people than politicians 
were, but that could only be performed if leaders could overcome their deference to their 
targets. Mobilizing African-Americans was also central, in part because they were 
understood to be easier to mobilize than whites. Building cross-race organizations also 
enabled the Congresses’ to claim to be better and more authoritative representatives while 
simultaneously undermining the politicians’ efforts to deflect issues of concern. 
However,  just as important was the fact that the Congresses had difficulty recruiting 
African-American organizers.  For white organizers the ability to mobilize African-
Americans was a key marker of professional skill as was the ability to get whites to focus 
                                                 
29 Cunningham interview with Marlene Weslian, Cunningham Collection. 
30 Disclosure, June 1976.  
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on their common opponents. Recalling this aspect of the Congresses, a BWCC leader’s  
thoughts are indicative, “I’m not saying people weren’t prejudiced, but they managed to 
put it in their back pockets long enough to deal with the issues that assaulted all of us.”31 
One of the symbols of the Congresses in the 1970s was a white hand shaking a black 
hand.  
 Discursively and dramaturgically, the Congresses made the case that they were 
more authentic representatives of communities than elected politicians and, therefore, 
they were the true source of political authority. It was the participatory and organizational 
construction of the People in the Congresses that gave them the right to hold politicians, 
bureaucrats, and corporate leaders accountable. Neighborhood leader Kathy Jaksic notes 
that the main issue was not policing, housing, energy prices or anything else. Instead, “it 
was a question of authority. Who was going to decide for this neighborhood?”32 For this 
reason, actions against these targets were never simply about resolving the issue in 
question, it was also about disciplining and reorienting the city’s “power elite” to be 
responsive to the true source of their authority.  
 The People did not exist naturally as an actor on the public stage. It was 
constituted through these internal and external modes of participation. But to leave it 
there would fall into the trap of assuming that participation is able to produce any number 
of determinate effects. In the case of the Congresses participation became a tool for 
challenging urban elites and governors. It was a technology that enabled the creation of 
the People in opposition to “interests.” However, this capacity is not inherent to 
participation or deliberation. Participation in the Congresses derived its meaning and its 
purpose from the particular context and from a wide variety of connections to other 
places, people, institutions, and organizations.  
 The Reagan era was generally not friendly to community organizing. However the 
central event in the demise of the Congresses, the Hunt Club protest in which funders 
announced an end to funding for organizing, was not merely a problem for the city’s 
elite. The action also managed to fracture the People along two of the core fault lines of 
the movement: more and less radical Congresses (which partially mapped onto more and 
less African-American), and organizers versus leaders. Many in the less experienced and 
less radical Congresses felt the action served no strategic purpose and that they were 
manipulated into it by the professional organizers. The action also cost the Congresses 
the support of the archdiocese. Perhaps more important than these problematic tensions 
was that the participatory technology deployed by the Congresses was already losing 
some of its effectiveness. Most of the Congresses were already turning to physical 
redevelopment because it was a core part of their agenda and because their victories had 
secured resources that would enable them to do so. Second, a new generation of 
politicians, led by George Voinovich, were happy to acknowledge the authority of 
community organizations, eliminating the issue of recognition and begging the question 
of how to work together. Many responded to this question by becoming essential 
contributors to the institutionalization of a system for the large-scale redevelopment of 
                                                 
31 Cunningham interviews with Diane Yambor, Tom Gannon, John Calkins, Kathy Jaksic, and Mike 
O’Brien. Cunningham Collection.  
32 Cunningham interview with Kathy Jaksic. Cunningham Collection. 
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the city’s neighborhoods, what came to be known as the “community development 
industry system.”33  
 The organizing style of the Congresses would persist at a couple of the new CDCs 
and many initially viewed organizing and development as complimentary. But with staff 
turnover, little funding support for organizing, and the growing professional requirements 
of community development, the participatory practices of the Congresses fell by the 
wayside.34 Instead, a very large population of CDCs emerged. With the elimination of the 
Congresses, CDCs became the authorized representatives of the city’s neighborhoods, 
and they were expected to take on a broad range of governance functions as well as 
responsibility for neighborhood well-being and physical redevelopment. Despite the 
demise of the neighborhood counterpubublic, the struggle over what participation was to 
mean was not over. Instead, the conflict shifted to the field of community development 
itself.  
 
Community Development and the Rise and Fall of Professional Closure 
In 1980 there were three types of organizations that claimed to represent Cleveland’s 
communities; CDCs, the Community Congresses, and the ward operations of City 
Councilors. The trajectory of these organizations makes clear that the organizational form 
of the CDC came to be broadly useful, a utility that is evident in the very rapid increase 
in the number of CDCs from ten to fifty-five between 1975 and 1996. CDCs were useful 
to community residents because they served as brokers of resources coming from 
government and private philanthropy to rebuild the city’s neighborhoods, one of the 
central planks in the platform of the Congresses. They were useful to City Councilors 
because they could serve as vehicles for spending funds in ways that tied neighborhood 
residents to their electoral operations. Finally, they were useful to growth-oriented elites 
because physical redevelopment served the purpose of maximizing the exchange value of 
the city’s real estate in an apparently civic rather than self-interested manner. 
Community development is frequently presented as a unified movement that 
works to rebuild urban neighborhoods.35 There is indeed much that unifies CDCs, 
characteristics that were defined in the struggle with community organizing over the 
authoritative organizational form for the representation of neighborhood interests. CDCs 
in Cleveland represent a defined geographical area at the sub-urban scale, such as a ward, 
a neighborhood, or a statistical planning area. They realize their goals through the use of 
collaborative public-private partnerships rather than confrontational protest. Finally, they 
measure community well-being using real estate values and engage in physical 
development to increase those values. These organizations were producing several 
hundred houses per year before the foreclosure crisis, though this volume did not come 
close to outstripping the foreclosure rate in Cleveland even before the crisis that began in 
                                                 
33 Jordan Yin, “The Community Development Industry System: A Case Study of Politics and Institutions 
in Cleveland, 1967-1997” Journal of Urban Affairs 20, no. 2 (1998): 137-157. 
34 For a discussion of this dynamic see Randy Stoecker, “The Community Development Corporation Model 
of Community Development: A Critique and an Alternative,” Journal of Urban Affairs 19 (1997): 1-23. 
35 Herbert Rubin, Renewing Hope within Neighborhoods of Despair (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000); 
Alexander Von Hoffman, House by House, Block by Block: The Rebirth of America’s Urban 
Neighborhoods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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2007. Nonetheless, many neighborhoods did experience a visible improvement in their 
well-being and, according to some benefitted in other ways as well.36 
These ideas about development were part of a philanthropic project to develop 
tools and metrics of successful community development. The Ford Foundation in 
particular was instrumental in developing program-related investments to facilitate 
philanthropic support of development projects and a new emphasis on the importance of 
real estate values as the primary measurement of community well-being. This approach is 
encapsulated in Grogan and Proscio’s book, Comeback Cities, which is probably better 
understood as a manifesto. Situating themselves in a long tradition of thinking on 
community development, Grogan and Proscio argue that attempting to eliminate poverty 
is a bad way to improve neighborhoods. What is needed is “a careful restoration of 
order—in the built environment, in public spaces, and in people’s lives.”37 For Grogan 
and Proscio, the role of the CDC is not so much to represent the community, they note 
that CDCs have “learned to steer clear of the… us-versus-them ideology that mired 
grassroots groups for decades,” but to prime the pump of real estate markets through 
supply-side intervention. Blight that could discourage investment is assaulted using a 
combination of tools. CDCs deal with the particular problems of different parcels using a 
variety of development tools, such as LIHTC-funded housing or market-rate 
developments. The strategic deployment of development tools is enabled by an 
objectifying gaze that is manifested in land use maps and strategic plans. Often, CDCs 
have design review powers that enable them to block development that cannot be 
integrated into the plan. Housing development is the most powerful tool CDCs have 
available for reviving local markets because of the combination of its desirability from 
the point of view of the CDC, the availability of a well-funded and diverse set of tools, 
and the availability of the relevant skill-sets among the CDCs. 
Driving around a neighborhood with a CDC director one can immediately see 
how this process works. After showing off a number of shiny new developments, 
including commercial, market-rate, low-income, rentals, and homes for ownership, the 
director comments on the lots as they roll by: “We’ll probably put some LIHTC housing 
there (pointing to a few bombed-out storefronts). The lots won’t support market-rate 
housing, so we can use LIHTC units to put some new units in an undesirable location.” 
Other locations are deemed more appropriate for market-rate housing and even high-end 
townhouses (“they are in walking distance of University Circle.”). My guide had a vision 
that is organized by matching policy tools with the needs of individual lots in order to 
maximize the potential revalorization of real estate values, a vision which was defined by 
the logic of professional community development practice in the 1990s. Much of her day-
to-day work involved putting together financing deals, seeking tenants, and shepherding 
projects through various approvals. 
 The differences with the Congresses are stark. The primary artifacts of those 
organizations are protest banners, publications that aimed to be the voice of a movement, 
phone lists and sign in sheets—archival remnants of a many-headed hydra of community 
                                                 
36 Cunningham, Democratizing Cleveland; Norman Krumholz, W. Dennis Keating, Philip D. Star, and 
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deliberation and activism. In contrast, CDCs work out of offices that have walls lined 
with planning maps of their “service areas” and certificates acknowledging the 
completion of courses on a wide variety of topics including financial management, real 
estate development and marketing, and organizational leadership. Contemporary CDCs 
have generally empowered technocrats, expert in physical redevelopment and urban 
planning, as the representatives of community interests.38 It has also empowered funders 
and lenders in defining the appropriate interventions in the city’s neighborhoods.  
 The empowerment of expert managers at the community scale had serious 
consequences for participation in CBOs. The authority of the CDCs within the city’s 
neighborhoods hinged upon the ability of community development experts to define 
needs and apply the appropriate solutions. However, community developers trained to see 
the world through the prism of real estate values, and to intervene in communities using 
capital-intensive physical redevelopment, naturally define problems and solutions in 
particular ways that do not necessarily correspond with the priorities of community 
residents. Indeed, once real estate values become the measure of community well-being, 
physical redevelopment in poorer neighborhoods began to target suburban professionals 
rather than existing residents, transforming the representative logic of community 
organizations. As for existing residents, they become a nuisance “indigenous population” 
that stands in the way of development.39 CBOs were disconnected from the communities 
they represented and were creating a setting to attract an “imagined community” of 
affluent future residents. 
 Because of its emphasis on the revalorization of real estate, the technocratic 
approach to community development has been broadly supported by the municipal 
bureaucracy, private philanthropies, and local growth-oriented elites. Nonetheless, even 
though community organizing was marginalized, the consensus that emerged around the 
technocratic model of community development by 2000 was not unchallenged. CDCs 
were also a useful organizational form for ward-based politicians. Politicians who take a 
clientelist approach to representing their wards use CDCs to engage in what Marwell 
calls “triadic exchange.”40 Effectively, CDCs enable politicians to link the programmatic 
activities of CDCs to electoral politics. Programs are used to create “organizational 
adherents” that are then assumed to be loyal to the Councilor on Election Day.  For many 
in the field of community development, this sort of relationship is a modern-day form of 
“legitimate graft.” It siphons resources from appropriate community development 
activities and, moreover, it enables corrupt Councilors to maintain their grip on their 
wards. Community development is subordinated to the logic of electoral politics.41 
                                                 
38 On technocracy see: Miguel Centeno, “The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy.” 
Theory and Society 22, no. 3 (1993): 307-335. 
39 A CDC director characterized the efforts of neighborhood residents to retain control of their CDC this 
way. He, on the other hand, felt that his job was to “throw the door open to investment” because “private 
capital has an ego too.” 
40 Nicole Marwell, “Privatizing the Welfare State: Nonprofit Community-Based Organizations as Political 
Actors,” American Sociological Review, 69, no. 2 (2004): 265-291; Nicole Marwell, Bargaining for 
Brooklyn: Community Organizations in the Entrepreneurial City (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2007). 
41 Looking at maps in the City Department of Community Development does not suggest any difference in 
the ability of technocratic or clientelist CDCs to affect real estate values.  
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 However, it should be noted that among clientelist CDCs the view is quite 
different and the participatory practices of these organizations are worth considering. One 
CDC executive director presented her organization as representatives of the people of the 
ward, not “interests” or “corporations.” She claimed they are distinguished by a desire to 
build amenities for existing residents rather than “golf clubs” for suburbanites. Their 
authority as representatives of the community is not derived from a broad-base of 
leadership or the demonstration of community solidarity through mobilization and 
protest. There is little in the way of democratic deliberation. She claimed it, naturally 
enough, based on electoral authority—the Councilor was elected by the residents of the 
ward. But alone this is not enough. Clientelist ward politicians have dense networks of 
relations with people throughout their wards and they organize them into ward clubs. 
These are participatory venues, though participants tend to be highly deferential to the 
status and authority of the Councilor. Despite how they are presented by their 
technocratic opponents in the field, these politicians are not simply venal. Indeed, many 
of them live in nondescript houses and use their relative poverty as a marker of 
authenticity, something which is often augmented by invocations of religious faith.42 
They pursue equity in the distribution of resources and sometimes pursue redistributive 
policy.43 The status of the politicians is instead expressed in the ability to call upon 
numerous people to do favors of various kinds, from fixing a house, to driving them on 
errands, to getting free meals.  
 The mode of participation in these organizations does little to develop the 
autonomous power of civil society organizations or the leadership skills or political 
sophistication of anyone other than the Councilor. Nor is the point to constitute an 
autonomous neighborhood voice or the civil society organizations that might underpin 
one. The effective clientelist Councilor is the central node in a dense network of relations 
that ensures accountability to neighborhood residents that extends well beyond the voting 
booth. In contrast with technocratic community developers, clientelist CDCs rely on the 
charisma of the Councilor and their ability to use their position to secure goods and 
services for their constituents, even by shaking down technocratic CDCs for a share of 
developers’ fees. This is justified in the name of acting on behalf of “the people” against 
the needs of other CDCs that are obsessed with development. The Councilor knows what 
these needs are because she has personal relationships with community members, 
something which the technocratic CDCs cannot claim: “I have yet to see any other ward 
where the councilperson can walk down the street and everybody is going to stop and 
talk… and a lot of it is based on the fact that our Councilperson… answers her own 
phone.” The respondent is incorrect on one point, many Councilors do this. One 
exasperated CDC director responded to a question on this point by noting that he has seen 
the Councilor “mow someone’s lawn in the middle of the day!” while a CDC trade 
association director can cite numerous organizations on her member list that are 
organized similarly, much to her chagrin.  
                                                 
42 Such invocations are increasingly prominent among representatives of the African-American East Side. 
On the West Side religion also plays a role in the authority of the Councilor, they are overwhelmingly 
Roman Catholic and many derive some authority from church attendance, but it is less prominent on 
Councilor websites. 
43 At a City Council meeting I saw a clientelist Councilor insist that a pilot recycling program be conducted 
in all wards equally, indicating a misunderstanding of the phrase “pilot project.” The same Councilor 
sponsored legislation requiring all construction managers to hire neighborhood residents on their projects. 
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 Clientelist CDCs have difficulty reproducing themselves due to their close ties 
with individual politicians and the relative absence of formal organization. Moreover, 
status in the field of community organizations as a whole has increasingly privileged 
professional community development and urban planning skills. As a consequence, these 
organizations have trouble securing funds without their patrons. The death rate of these 
organizations is far higher than other types of CDC, and the clientelist position is slowly 
being eliminated from the field. In terms of the ability of CBOs to effectively represent 
neighborhood residents, the elimination of the clientelist position has the effect of 
eliminating an organizational type that relies upon participation for its ability to represent 
the community.  
Rather than securing the uncontested authority of community development 
experts, the eventual dominance of technocratic CDCs threatened the very purpose of 
community organizations. Professionalizing CDCs made sense in the context of the 
struggle with clientelist CDCs and their political patrons, but this also undermined their 
utility as a foundation for elite authority. Once we recognize this function it is not 
surprising that renewed calls for neighborhood participation in CBOs did not come from 
politicians or the residents themselves, it came from private-sector funders of CDCs. By 
2000 it had become apparent to funders that the meaning of community had been reduced 
to a synonym for organizational territory. The term was being drained of its association 
with authentic and unmediated social relations, self-governance, and democratic 
deliberation. Organizational boards were increasingly populated by local bankers, 
funders, and other community development professionals. To the extent that residents 
were still involved, they were mere tokens. Participation was necessary to buttress the 
claim of CDCs to represent their neighborhoods on development issues. An intermediary 
organization vice president explained the dilemma that led to this renewal simply: 
“funders were coming to annual meetings [of CDCs] and there was nobody there.” 
Technocratic CBOs are unable to effectively consecrate the priorities of urban elites 
because they no longer plausibly represent the city’s neighborhoods.  
 
Making Participation Safe for Use: Consensus Organizing 
The return to community organizing among Cleveland’s CBOs began in 2002 
with a new round of philanthropic funding and a commitment by support organizations to 
train new organizers. Organizing has since come to be considered a core component of 
professional community development practice and many CDCs have hired full-time staff 
organizers.  These organizers mostly organize and service street clubs in CDC service 
areas. Notably, this participaton was not being demanded, it was being given by private-
sector philanthropies. This effort would solve a problem that had emerged with the 
rationalization of technocratic CDCs around the goal of physical redevelopment: how to 
support the claim that CDCs were legitimate representatives of the city’s neighborhoods? 
Because resources were being given in exchange for the symbolic capital necessary to 
legitimate the rule of political and growth-oriented elites, it became necessary to recreate 
participatory practices in the city’s CBOs. But while organizing street clubs can help 
solve that problem, it creates a new one: what is to prevent newly organized community 
residents from recreating the contentious Congresses that has helped precipitate the crisis 
of growth politics? 
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The key puzzle that CDCs had to resolve was how to be legitimate representatives 
of the community when they were organized to respond to the imagined community of 
future residents. Why would people participate? What would happen when they pursued 
their interests? New technologies of participation made this possible, the most important 
of these for CDCs is consensus organizing. Consensus organizing enables CDCs to offer 
neighborhood stakeholders voice and venues to construct community solidarity. But this 
comes with costs. As with all extra-governmental participatory fora, one cost is the 
marginalization of formal mechanisms of representation that can hold decision makers 
accountable. Moreover, the privileging of markets as the primary metric of well-being 
and the determinant of appropriate organizational action eliminated the organization as a 
buffer between community residents and the effects of markets. Finally, this mode of 
participation requires accepting normative standards of civility that trump the use of 
power or contention to secure goals. Compared to the unaccountable and generally 
unconnected nature of technocratic CDCs, this is an attractive way to have one’s voice 
heard. However, it is probably also the case that such a tradeoff looks more attractive 
only after other modes of participating and developing community solidarity, such as 
those in the Congresses and clientelist CDCs, have been marginalized. This type of 
citizen participation leaves no room for the recreation of a neighborhood counterpublic. 
 Consensus organizing was developed by Michael Eichler as a direct competitor of 
Alinskyite community organizing.44 Despite being eliminated in Cleveland, community 
organizing groups have grown nationally. Alinskyite community organizations are often 
recognized as legitimate voices of the community in many cities. Without having to 
demand recognition the need to protest outdoors has declined, but contention over issues 
has often simply moved indoors.45 Nonetheless, Eichler argues that “conflict organizing” 
worked in an era when there was a single, politically unsophisticated enemy that was 
easy to identify. Of course, many community organizers would argue that conflict is 
often still necessary because of power inequalities. For Eichler inequalities do not prevent 
finding the common ground necessary for consensus. The implication is that there are no 
Bull Connors or Richard Daleys anymore. Authority rests on different practices and 
logics that are not as exclusive. Because of this, technologies designed to disrupt older 
forms of authority are rendered impotent. Community organizing has not adapted to new 
modes of authority built on participation and, therefore, it is “tired” and “ineffective.”  
 None of this is really true in the details. Community organizing has changed quite 
a bit and it is often criticized by scholars for being devoid of ideology, not overly 
ideological as Eichler portrays it.46 Nonetheless, while missing the target, Eichler is on to 
something. Namely, the nature of urban authority has indeed changed. Alinsky’s 
community organizing was a technology that was designed to deal with the authority of 
growth politics, premised as it was on political closure and economic mobility. In the 
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neoliberal era this mode of authority is inverted. Access and participation are expansive 
and relativized in a context of downward mobility and increasing socio-economic 
inequality, short-circuiting institutional critiques that emphasized inadequate democracy 
rather than socio-economic inequality. Consensus organizers, on the other hand, use 
“tactics of partnership and understanding” to build trust and arrive at mutually beneficial 
results. Rather than a tool for making decisions, consensus is sacralized while conflict is 
rendered profane.  
 Eichler’s technology has been attractive to community developers since the mid-
1990s. The reason is clear: consensus organizing enables community developers to 
effectively challenge the claims of community organizers to be the authorized 
representatives of neighborhoods. While this was unnecessary in Cleveland where 
community organizing had been marginalized before consensus organizing emerged, it 
was an issue elsewhere. The Ford Foundation initially funded consensus organizing 
demonstration projects in support of community development efforts in Little Rock and 
Baton Rouge, strongholds of ACORN.47 LISC, the Ford-funded community development 
financing organization, also funded Eichler’s consensus organizing center in San Diego 
and disseminated the technology around the country. In cities with a significant 
community organizing presence, consensus organizing serves as an alternative 
technology of participation that relativizes and competes with Alinskyite organizing.  
 The model is entirely appropriate in a field of CBOs that relies heavily on 
connections with banks, developers, the City, and the City Council to be effective. 
Technocratic community development in Cleveland has always distinguished itself from 
organizing by emphasizing the efficacy of partnerships rather than conflict. However, for 
a decade technocratic CDCs had ignored community residents; now they energetically 
organize them into street clubs. Organizing is now considered an essential component of 
CDC activity and an essential component of physical redevelopment. Funding in the field 
has been shifting away from the most efficient developers and to organizations that have 
thicker connections with neighborhoods. 
 The street clubs built by consensus organizers have limited authority in CDCs. 
They have little to do with land use decisions, the allocation of capital, or developing 
neighborhood plans. These essential questions continue to be the realm of the 
professional community developer. In fact, when CDC directors are asked about street 
clubs and what they do, they generally cite their effectiveness on quality of life issues 
(policing) and their input on design. When architectural plans are developed, street clubs 
are often asked for comment. Of course, community residents are not architects, so they 
are unlikely to produce an alternative. However, examples of residents making decisions 
about the height of yard fences, parking arrangements, and the depth of porch overhangs 
are not uncommon. The most widely celebrated success of consensus organizing is a case 
where organizing reduced racial tensions prompted by a large housing development 
designed to attract suburban buyers. This organizing relied on the old encounter group 
model of easing racial tensions rather than working together to address problems that 
affect everyone in the neighborhood. In this case, the organizing paved the way for 
physical redevelopment that was not popular among existing residents by subordinating 
                                                 
47 Ross Gittell and Avis Vidal, Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a Development Strategy 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998) 
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the interests and aspirations of neighborhood stakeholders to the normative expectation of 
civility. 
 These characteristics are reflected in the self-understanding of contemporary 
community organizers in Cleveland. They claim to be “consensus builders” who build 
“positive relationships” even though this means “not encouraging residents” who 
presumably might be more combative. When issues are difficult civility is deployed to 
avoid contention. One organizer encourages residents to “be mindful of who you’re 
addressing and how you address them because there are ways to get what you want 
without causing a fight.” After all, “we’re all partners.” It is now possible for residents to 
“be more inclusive” and have “residents sit down with businesses.” Among the 
accomplishments of consensus organizing celebrated in one CDC are “community 
building walks,” a “welcome wagon” program (that welcomes new residents to the 
neighborhood), and ideas for neighborhood improvements such as the installation of yard 
lights.  
When asked why CDCs should be doing organizing at all, a CDC organizer says 
stakeholders are essential “for legitimacy.” “If you just plop something in the middle of a 
neighborhood and nobody knows about it, it may be accepted, but it might not be.” This 
goes to the heart of the purpose of consensus organizing in Cleveland. If interests were 
grounded in social position and aligned with the CDC, the issue of “acceptance” would 
not come up. Either something would be opposed or accepted depending on how the 
project aligned with the interests of existing residents. The question arises when physical 
redevelopment is disconnected from community needs. How then can CDCs claim to be 
authoritative representatives of neighborhoods? “Welcome wagons” street clubs serve 
that purpose admirably. “Generally, when people are informed of situations they are able 
to discuss it more rationally and not be so tuned up and acting on their emotions.”  
Consensus organizing is a technology of participation that enables CDCs to claim 
popular authority for the actions of expert developers even when developers fail to act in 
the interest of existing residents.48 As such, they are also able to consecrate the activities 
of their funders, politicians and growth-oriented elites, as legitimately civic. In the 
absence of this participatory technology CDCs would be able to engage in physical 
redevelopment, but they would not be able to serve their primary role which is to 
underpin the legitimacy of the city’s governors.  
As a participatory technology, consensus organizing is not intended to develop a 
common identity and interest among neighborhood residents, which might be the basis 
for making claims in public. Indeed, deliberation, contention, and accountability are 
rarely found in contemporary CDCs, even though the number of street clubs organized by 
them is growing and participation is increasingly important to funders. Rather, organizers 
manage street clubs to avoid contentious claims and to focus people on resources that are 
available in existing partnerships. Given the nature of CDC connections, this practically 
guarantees that the technocratic approach to neighborhood improvement gets reproduced 
in street clubs as a democratic choice rather than an imposition by experts.  
In other words, consensus organizing relies on the expert management of 
participation itself. This is a significant shift. While once participation was opposed to 
technocracy, in consensus organizing and other new technologies of participation they 
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have been fused. This does not mean that all organizing is a mere charade. CDCs pay 
very close attention to street clubs and not merely for the purpose of keeping a lid on 
them. Instead, they are useful forums for venting concerns and gleaning insights that can 
enhance the management of development. In other words, this type of participation is not 
merely about securing authority, but also about capturing the benefits of local knowledge 
and further socializing citizens into collaborative practices—even when the issues are not 
being addressed in ways that benefit the participants.  
Not surprisingly, these positive effects of participation are among the most widely 
celebrated in contemporary policy, though some urban scholars have observed similar 
technologies and recognize that the effect is to render a politics of community interest 
normatively out of bounds.49 When situated against the overall history and trajectory of 
conflict over the meaning and practice of participation in Cleveland, this arrangement is 
less an achievement to be celebrated than the product of the imperatives of contemporary 
urban governance and the narrowing of organizational diversity among CBOs. 
Participation is now an input in technocratic decision making and a foundation for the 
authority of elites that are unresponsive to pressing issues like unemployment and 
foreclosure. 
 
Conclusion 
Confronted with a crisis in the 1970s, Cleveland’s growth-oriented elites formed 
an organization, Cleveland Tomorrow, that would enable them to fund and implement 
their own agenda and social policy without the burden of democratic accountability. They 
created organizations, raised money, and set priorities for the city—among them, funding 
for neighborhood-based community development which helped establish the legitimacy 
of their claim to be acting in the civic interest. Thirty years later, the city was confronted 
with another crisis. Despite many policy interventions, funding initiatives, and premature 
celebrations of recovery, Cleveland was continuing to decline. In response, Cleveland’s 
growth-oriented elites wanted to re-scale governance to the regional scale. Rather than 
work out of smoke-filled rooms, they funded a massive public deliberation effort on the 
question of regional strategy called “Voices for Choices.” They hired a private contractor 
to provide “deliberation services” and held meetings across the region that had tens of 
thousands of participants. This did not resolve the question of rescaling, and that would 
not be its significance even if it did. What matters is the assumption, even by the city’s 
most exclusive and insulated leaders, that public participation is a necessary component 
of establishing the legitimacy of the effort.  
Cleveland’s crisis of political authority in the 1970s changed the way the city’s 
political and economic leaders viewed participation. Once something to be limited as 
much as possible, the Community Congresses and Dennis Kucinich altered the way 
political closure was understood in the city. The costs of closure to the legitimacy of 
public action had become too high. The issue was no longer to figure out whether or not 
participation should be tolerated, it was what type of participation would be most useful. 
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The Congresses had a very sophisticated technology of neighborhood participation, but it 
underpinned a neighborhood counterpublic and undermined elite authority. It was not 
usable as a foundation for elite authority. Nonetheless, the experimentation with 
participatory technologies began migrating out of protest movements and into elite 
foundations, bureaucratic agencies, strategic business organizations, and the ward 
operations of local politicians.  
Events in Cleveland were merely one manifestation of a much broader 
institutional revalorization of participation and experimentation with participatory 
technologies. Nonetheless, it is not simply a representative case. Cleveland’s crisis of 
political authority throws the issue into sharp relief. In Cleveland, growth, the basis of 
urban authority through much of the postwar period, could no longer legitimate the rule 
of political and economic elites. Of course, growth, or at least preventing decline, 
remained a key goal of policy that was widely shared, but it no longer functioned as a 
justification for exclusionary decision-making. Likewise with political authority. Simply 
being elected was no longer an adequate basis for representative authority, as Kucinich 
learned. The people would have to be heard before decisions could be made. The 
question was: how should they be heard. The potential of a counterpublic to disrupt elite 
authority was on display for everyone to see in Cleveland. Unlike in most American 
cities, institutional leaders across the city made the choice to crush rather than tolerate a 
neighborhood counterpublic. But this merely put the question in stark terms: what sort of 
participatory technology can elites use to ground their authority? Part of the answer was 
to rescale governance functions to the neighborhood, but this was inadequate when there 
was no community participating in them. Consensus organizing solves many of the 
dilemmas of participation as a tool for authority and, not surprisingly, it was not 
communities that renewed the push for participatory venues in CBOs, it was 
philanthropic funders.  
Our understanding of participation does not come from the observation of its 
practical uses or the battles to define its meaning. We lament the decline of civic 
participation and assume that expanding participation can be a source of democratic 
renewal, social solidarity, and better decisions. Of course, some kinds of participation can 
do this, but other types do not do anything of the sort and, in fact, participation can 
simply reinforce hierarchies, discipline public behavior into non-controversial dialogue, 
and undermine social solidarity. Simply put, participation has no inherent content. 
Different participatory technologies produce different effects and our conceptual and 
analytical efforts should be directed at the question of what types of participation are 
desirable and what effects do we value? Of course, this point is not original. However, it 
becomes much more significant when we appreciate that the meaning and practice of 
participation are objects of active intervention not simply by movement activists and 
democrats but corporate managers, growth-oriented elites, bureaucrats, and politicians. 
Participation is no longer a threat to elites, it is a resource. To talk intelligently about 
participation today requires a confrontation with this fact.  
Institutions are no longer based on limiting the public role in decision-making in 
exchange for the promise of affluence and economic mobility. This was the principle of 
growth politics in cities and it was also the exchange entailed in the creation of a 
bureaucratic welfare state. Economic openness and political closure. It is increasingly 
apparent that one of the most important changes in this neoliberal era is an inversion of 
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this dynamic. The popular voice is now broadly accepted as legitmate and valuable. At 
the same time, we have increasingly abandoned socio-economic equity and a politics of 
income as goals. Labor unions have been crushed, the social safety net has been 
dismantled, and the logic of the remuneration of labor is no longer based on income 
security. The question is: how is this possible alongside increased participation? In 
Cleveland it is apparent that part of gambit is that people will accept economic sacrifices 
when they are heard in the process of decision-making. But this is too simple. The other 
component is that participation is not organized to produce a collective position. Today’s 
participatory technologies do not formulate a collective position that can enable “the 
people,” or neighborhoods, or African-Americans to act as a political subject in the 
public sphere. Rather, participation works to fragment discussions into a plethora of 
distinct institutional settings and topically-focused fora. In those fora, responses are 
heard, they are often measured, and the variety of opinions demonstrates, above all else, 
that there is variety. This diffusion and proliferation of participatory practice relativizes 
the significance of all of it for decision making and no single perspective has the 
authority of “the people” behind it. The authority of “the people” has been acknowledged 
in institutional practice, but when combined with contemporary participatory 
technologies, the effect is to relativize and reduce the significance of that authority such 
that participation is little more than a step in the successful management of an issue, a 
box to check on the “To do” list of campaign managers and institutional leaders.   
My goal in this paper has been to make this process visible in order to further the 
discussion of participation in contemporary politics and institutions. By treating 
participatory practices as technologies designed to produce particular effects rather than 
as a “thing” with predictable effects it is possible to see how participation has been 
transformed. Once essential for challenging urban political authority and constructing 
vibrant counterpublics, participation is now a foundation for that authority and a tool for 
fragmenting and relativizing oppositional views. This process was not automatic. It is the 
outcome of decades of struggle over the meaning, content, and practice of participation. 
Participation is not the only concept to have this trajectory. A similar analysis could be 
made of “community” and its role in urban political authority and, no doubt, there are 
others. Collectively, the practical fate of these concepts reveals the danger of treating 
them as stable and relatively transparent signifiers that can be unproblematically 
manipulated in theory and discourse. Instead, we must treat them as objects and stakes of 
political struggles before we can hope to stabilize their content for theoretical discussion.  
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